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Abstract 
The Doha ministerial declaration commits industrialised countries to liberalising access for 
least-developed countries (LDCs) to their markets.  Preferential trade policies have diverse 
impacts on the initiating country and its trading partners.  These effects are of concern to 
scholars and policy makers.  We use Australia as a case study to quantify the direct and 
indirect effects of providing preferential access to LDC imports entering Australian markets, 
using a global general equilibrium model of the world economy.  LDCs are projected to 
benefit; Australia is predicted to lose, reflecting the dominance of trade diversion over trade 
creation effects and adverse terms of trade effects.  However, the magnitude of the adverse 
effect on Australia is small.  If one was to view this initiative as an exercise in foreign aid, it 
suggests that Australia can provide a significant benefit to the poorest nations with which it 
trades, at almost no cost to itself. 
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The Doha ministerial declaration commits industrialised countries to providing duty- and 
quota-free access to their markets for goods originating from developing countries and, 
especially, least-developed countries (LDCs).  Currently, 49 countries are designated by the 
United Nations (UN) as LDCs as their per capita incomes are among the lowest in the world 
(UNCTAD 2001b).  The improved access is intended to be non-reciprocal, that is, the 
initiative will not require beneficiary LDCs to respond by lowering their own tariffs.  In 
response to the Doha declaration, some industrialised countries have already provided tariff-
and quota-free access to their markets.  The European Union introduced the “Everything but 
Arms” initiative.  Other industrialised countries including Australia have announced similar 
initiatives for LDCs’ imports (UNCTAD 2001a). 
  Although increasing opportunities for trade alone is unlikely to resolve all the economic 
problems in LDCs, this policy is designed to provide an impetus for their economic 
development.  From a donor country’s point of view, therefore, it will be important to know, 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, what impact such an initiative may have on LDCs and 
on other trading partners, as well as on its own economy.  This paper uses Australia, a small 
open economy, as a case study to quantify the economic impacts of removing tariffs on goods 
originating from LDCs on the economies of LDCs, on developing and developed country 
trading partners, and on the Australian economy itself.  
  Like many other industrialised countries, Australia already had preferential agreements 
with selected developing countries prior to this new policy initiative.  This includes duty-free 
access to Australian markets by some developing countries, including LDCs, under the South 
Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA).  One of the 
main policy concerns in regard to the new initiative is the possible impact this new policy 
may have on SPARTECA members.  The degree of trade diversion created by preferential 
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negative. 
  As the assessment of this preferential trade policy involves many countries and 
commodities, it is conducted using a well-known and widely-used general equilibrium (GE) 
framework which captures bilateral trade between all major countries and regions in the 
world, and models individual country domestic economies, all at a high degree of commodity 
detail – the GTAP model (Hertel 1997).  We decompose our results to a greater degree of 
disaggregation from that in the model database, by developing and applying a post-solution 
procedure which includes individual trading partners that are not separately identified in the 
original database, but are important in their relevance to policy considerations.  
  The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 highlights some key 
factors that may influence the outcomes of preferential trade agreements (PTA) by briefly 
reviewing the literature on PTAs.  Section 3 outlines the main features of the GE framework 
applied in our analysis and the post-simulation procedure.  Section 4 describes Australian 
trade with LDCs and the policy initiatives modelled.  Section 5 presents and discusses our 
results.  The final section summarises the main findings and draws out policy implications. 
 
2  The theory of preferential trade agreements  
The traditional analysis of PTAs is based on the notion of “trade creation” and “trade 
diversion”, introduced by Viner (1950).  Since then, there has been an extensive literature on 
the effects of various PTAs such as customs unions and free trade areas.1  Both partial 
equilibrium (PE) and general equilibrium approaches have been used in analysing the impacts 
of PTAs on various parties.  As trade usually involves multiple trading partners, the PE 
                                              
1 For a recent survey, see Panagariya (2000). 
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and production, and can produce misleading results.  
  Let us now highlight some of the effects that determine the outcomes of PTAs based on 
theoretical models.  Imagine a simple stylised GE model with three countries (A, B and C) 
trading three goods (1, 2 and 3) with each other, where each country is assumed to produce 
and export one good and import the other two goods from its trading partners.  Consumers in 
all countries are assumed to have identical preferences for the three goods.  This pattern of 
trade and consumption implies that goods produced in different countries are imperfect 
substitutes in consumption.  Initially, all countries impose a tariff on the imported goods (of 
which there are 2) and tariff revenue is redistributed to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion.  
In this framework, it can be shown that if the country introducing a tariff preference for one of 
its trading partners is too small to affect the world prices of the goods it exports and imports, 
then this country will normally benefit from preferential liberalisation.  This case is 
effectively equivalent to a PE analysis of a small open economy, in which the terms of trade 
for the liberalising country are fixed and any change in world prices is ruled out by 
assumption.2  
  If the small country assumption is relaxed in a GE context, however, the above results 
will change.  The feedback effects from the rest of the world alter the results for the 
liberalising country.  As Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have shown in a similar analysis, 
the introduction of a tariff preference may benefit the preference receiver, and hurt the other 
partner and the liberalising country itself.  This is because the liberalising country is no longer 
small relative to the rest of the world, implying that the tariff preference will lead to a 
deterioration of that country’s terms of trade.  As a result, the liberalising country may lose 
from its own preferential trade liberalisation.  The intuition behind this result can be explained 
                                              
2 This is also the result of the Meade-Lipsey small-union model (Lipsey 1958). 
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let country A produce and export good 1, and import goods 2 and 3.  Then suppose that 
country A removes the tariff on good 2 imported from country B.  The removal of tariffs 
expands the imports of good 2, which is beneficial trade creation.  But, as good 2 and 3 are 
substitutes in consumption, the removal of tariffs also leads to a contraction of imports of 
good 3 from country C, which is harmful trade diversion.  Country B benefits from trade 
creation while country C loses from trade diversion.  
  The net effect on country A depends on the relative magnitude of these two effects.  As 
the domestic good (good 1) and imported good 2 are net substitutes, with a fixed trade 
balance, the tariff removal expands the value of exports by country A at world prices.  If the 
value of imports of good 2 expands more than the contraction in the value of imports of good 
3, the beneficial effect of trade creation dominates the harmful effect of trade diversion. To 
what extent this will occur depends on the substitutability between each pair of goods as well 
as the relative magnitudes of the relevant tariffs.  As Panagariya and Duttagupta (1999) have 
pointed out, this analytical ambiguity assigns a critical role to parameters in GE models 
determining the degree of substitutability between the domestic and imported composite, on 
the one hand, and between import sources, on the other. 
  This analytical model, though simple, is useful for illustrating the complexity of PTA 
analysis.  It shows that the GE effects of non-reciprocal PTAs depend on whether goods are 
net complements to, or substitutes for, the goods whose imports are being liberalised.  In 
reality, however, other important factors may interact with the factors specified in the simple 
model, such as trade in and use of intermediate inputs in production and saving-investment 
decisions. A GE model of world trade between many countries and regions accounts for many 
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comprehensive framework, the effects highlighted in the analytical model presented above are 
still present; however, they will be intertwined with and influenced by other factors that are 
incorporated into a GE model.  The net outcome will be more difficult to predict in an applied 
GE model than in an analytical GE model.  The results are dependent on the parameter 
settings, data and the model’s structure.  
 
3  Numerical models and databases 
We are interest in determining the size and the sign of the effects of a nonreciprocal PTA by 
Australia with LDCs.  To capture the complexity of such a policy change, we apply two 
numerical models: an applied GE model and a post-solution model.  The former is used to 
capture the effects on Australia and its major trading partners.  The latter is used to quantify 
the effects on exports by LDCs to Australia, and exports to Australia by other countries of 
interest that are not separately identified in the database of the applied GE model. 
 
3.1  The applied GE model and database 
The applied GE model used here is the GTAP model, version 6.1.4  The model divides the 
world economy into geographical regions and each regional economy into industries.  Goods 
produced by an industry in different regions are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for 
imports.  Domestic and imported goods form constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
                                              
3 For applied GE analyses of non-reciprocal PTAs, see Brown (1988, 1989); Srinivasan, Whalley and Wooton 
(1993); and Robinson and Thierfelder (1999). 
4 The original model is documented in Hertel (1997).  Version 6.1 is available at 
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/GTAP/.  The experiment was implemented using the GEMPACK software 
suite (Harrison and Pearson 1996). 
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production and investment formation.  
  Within each region, a single household represents both consumers and factor owners.  
Consumers are assumed to have identical preferences over composite goods.  The government 
collects taxes and spends them on goods provided to households for final consumption.  Total 
regional income is allocated between household consumption, government consumption and 
savings.  Consumers’ demands for goods and services have constant difference of elasticities 
(CDE) functional forms.  Industries use composite intermediate inputs and primary factors of 
production to produce outputs.  Production technologies exhibit constant returns to scale.  
Composite intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions while primary factors of 
production are substitutable with each other in total value-added.  Among the five primary 
factors of production specified in the model, skilled, unskilled labour and capital are perfectly 
mobile across domestic industries, while land and natural resources are immobile and are used 
only in agricultural and mining industries.  All primary factors are immobile internationally.  
Returns to factors of production accrue to households in the form of income which, in turn, 
finances consumption demand and savings.  Household savings can finance either domestic or 
foreign investment.  
  At the macroeconomic level, household consumption, government consumption and net 
(of depreciation) savings in each region are a variable share of regional income.  These 
aggregates vary in response to changes in regional income and prices.5  It is assumed that net 
investment will be reallocated across regions to equalise the expected rate of return on 
regional investment.  All changes are evaluated relative to a price index for the world 
endowment of factors, which serves as the numeraire.  The model is comparative static: it 
                                              
5 This behaviour is the result of combining a Cobb-Douglas utility function with a CDE functional form for 
consumer demand (see McDougall 2002). 
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alternative policy scenarios with no reference to the time path between the two equilibrium 
points. 
  The database used in our simulations is the GTAP database version 5 (Dimaranan and 
McDougall 2002), where 1997 is the base year.  The original database divides the world into 
66 regional economies, each of which consists of 57 industries.  Bilateral trade data are 
combined with protection and transportation cost data to represent fundamental international 
trade linkages across regions.  Detailed input–output databases account for the inter-sectoral 
linkages and other economic relationships within each regional economy.  For the purposes of 
this study, the database is aggregated into 39 regional groups and 43 industries (see tables 2 
and 5).  Within the 39 aggregated regions, 13 regions include LDCs.  Of these 13 regions, six 
are individual LDCs (Bangladesh, Malawi, Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia) and seven are regional groups including some LDCs (Rest of South 
Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, Rest of Middle East, Rest of South African 
Customs Union, Rest of Southern Africa, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of World).  
 
3.2  The post-solution model and database 
A post-solution simulation model is developed to quantify the impacts of preferential 
liberalisation on Australian trading partners of interest, which are not identified separately in 
the model database.  The post-solution simulation is based on a model describing Australian 
demand for imports originating from each of the countries included in the 7 aggregate LDC-
inclusive regions in the database (i.e., Rest of South Asia, Central America and the Caribbean, 
Rest of Middle East, Rest of South African Customs Union, Rest of Southern Africa, Rest of 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the Rest of World).  The import demand functions are of CES form.  
  8Thus, the post-solution simulation model assumes that, for Australian users, imports of 
commodities from different countries are (imperfectly) substitutable with each other.  
  In percentage change form, the demand for a given imported commodity from country i, 
qi, (where country i is part of an aggregated region) is expressed as,  
  qi = q – σ (pi – p),   σ    0,          (1)  ≥
where q denotes the percentage change in the demand for composite imports of the given 
commodity from all countries in the aggregated region; pi is the domestic price (in Australia) 
of the imported commodity from country i; p is the average price of the imported commodity 
from all countries in the aggregated region, weighted by the shares in the value of total 
imports of the given commodity; and σ is the CES between any pair of imports of the given 
commodity from two source countries. 
  The domestic price (in Australia) of the imported commodity from country i, pi, is 
defined as,  
  pi = piw + ti  ,                ( 2 )  
where piw is the world (c.i.f.) price of the imported commodity from country i, and ti is the 
power of ad valorem tariff rate for the imported commodity from country i.  
  The post-solution model is calibrated as follows. The value of σ is taken from the GTAP 
5 database.  The percentage changes in the world prices of imports, piw, and the Australian 
demand for total imports of a given commodity, q, are taken from the GE model simulation 
results. It is assumed that all countries in a given regional group face the same world prices 
for their exports (the small country assumption).  Considering the small size of most 
economies included in those regional groups, this assumption seems reasonable.  For instance, 
the simulated response in Australian demand for imports of clothing from Cambodia is a 
function of the projected change in the price and quantity of imports of clothing for the 
regional group in which Cambodia is included.  The Australian domestic market price of a 
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the Australian tariff for the source region of the imported commodity.  
  The data on Australian imports used in the post-solution simulation model are obtained 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and other sources.6  They include the values 
of imports from all sources at the HS 4-digit level and the values of duties paid on relevant 
imports.  The HS trade data are aggregated to match the 42 traded commodity groups (not 
including services) in the model database. The ad valorem tariff rates are calculated as the 
value of duties paid divided by the c.i.f. value of imports.  The 42 LDCs that exported to 
Australia in 1997, and which are included in the post-simulation analysis, are listed in the 
appendix. 
 
4  Australia’s trade with LDCs and tariff structure 
Let us now briefly describe Australia’s trade with LDCs and existing tariffs on imports from 
LDCs, as these will be important in determining the effects of Australia providing duty-free 
access to LDCs.  Australia currently provides preferential market access for developing 
countries under the Australian System of Tariff Preferences (ASTP) scheme and SPARTECA.  
The ASTP scheme reduces the tariff rate for imports from developing countries by 5 
percentage points if MFN rates not zero or above 5 per cent, while SPARTECA allows duty-
free entry for imports from member countries. 
  The ASTP scheme excludes some products from tariff preferences, including important 
LDC exports, such as textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF).  Non-SPARTECA LDCs still 
face high tariffs in some categories of TCF, particularly apparel and certain finished textiles.   
                                              
6 Data were extracted from a variety of sources, including ABS (2002) International Trade, Australia, Cat. No. 
5465.0, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2001 Database and various UNCTAD, UN, WTO, 
World Bank and IMF publications.  Australian production data was sourced from ABS (1998) Manufacturing 
Production, Commodities Produced, Australia, Cat. No. 8365.0. 
  10TCF is an important export to Australia for these LDCs; imports from LDCs were valued at 
A$242 million in 2001-02, more than half of which were TCF.  Australian imports from 
LDCs are primarily from Asian LDCs.  Of these, Bangladesh accounts for around three-
quarters of Australia’s imports of TCF from LDCs. 
 The  GTAP 5 database contains 1997 import tariff rates on Australian commodity imports 
originating from LDCs.  However, these rates do not reflect the ASTP.  Therefore, the tariff 
rates were modified to be consistent with the tariffs reported by the ABS trade statistics 
(2002).  Table 1 reports the tariff rates for TCF imports only, as most tariffs on LDC imports 
by Australia are below 5 per cent.  
Table 1  Average tariff rates on Australian TCF imports from LDCs, 1997 (per cent) 
Country Textiles Clothing Footwear
Bangladesh 0.10 33.36 1.40
Tanzania 0 31.91 0
Uganda 0 34.16 0
Haiti   0 29.17 0
Cambodia   12.70 29.69 0
Laos PD Republic  0 29.20 0
Burma   9.88 18.40 0
Maldives   0 25.29 0
Nepal   0.96 8.87 0.46
Lesotho   0 33.74 0
Democratic Republic of Congo   0 34.19 0
Ethiopia   0 27.08 0
Gambia   13.64 0 0
Madagascar 0 8.71 0
Mali 0 18.97 0
Senegal 14.22 14.07 8.76
Note: (1) The average tariff rates are calculated using import values as weights.  (2) LDCs with no TCF exports 
to Australia or not subject to Australia TCF tariffs are not included in the table. 
Source: ABS (2002).  
 
  Our policy experiment consists of removing all remaining tariffs on Australian imports 
from LDCs in the adjusted database.  For the 6 regions representing individual LDCs, the 
removal of all tariffs on imports into Australia is relatively straightforward: all tariffs are 
reduced to zero.  For the 7 regional groupings that include only some LDCs, the regional 
tariffs are removed in proportion to the LDC duty shares.  The duty shares are calculated from 
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removed for the imports of all LDCs that are not specified individually in the GE simulation.  
 
5  Simulation results and discussion 
Table 2 presents the general effects of the Australian initiative on all LDCs and other regions 
in the world, in terms of percentage changes in real gross domestic product (GDP) and trade.  
Almost all LDCs and LDC-inclusive regions are projected to benefit from the preferential 
access to Australian markets in terms of real GDP, with Bangladesh and other South Asian 
countries being the major beneficiaries.  Some LDCs are projected to be slightly worse off; 
these are among those with little or no trade with Australia, or trade in commodities which 
attract low or no tariffs. 
  Australia is projected to be worse off, as predicted by the analytical model presented in 
section 2.  However, the loss is negligible due to the small size of the overall tariffs removed 
and the small share of imports from LDCs into Australia. Nonetheless, as Australian domestic 
goods are assumed to be substitutable for imports from LDCs, the Australian terms of trade 
are affected adversely.  This effect contributes largely to the overall loss for Australia.  The 
reverse is true for the beneficiary LDCs.  Most other trading partner countries are largely 
unaffected by the Australian LDC initiative.  They experience either small gains or small 
losses, depending, among other things, to what extent their exports compete with LDC 
exports in the Australian market.  
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Region  Real GDP Export volume  Import volume
LDC regions    
Bangladesh
 a 0.000662 0.017961 0.041132 
Rest of South Asia
 b 0.000127 -0.001205  0.002746 
Rest of World
 b 0.000080 0.001684 0.003022 
Uganda
 a   0.000061  -0.001584  0.003443 
Central America and the Caribbean
 b 0.000022 -0.000049  0.000220 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
 b 0.000013 0.000072 0.000261 
Mozambique
 a 0.000012 -0.000408  0.000118 
Rest of Southern Africa
 b 0.000127 -0.001025  0.002746 
Tanzania
 a 0.000009 -0.000023  0.000249 
Malawi
 a 0.000005 -0.000078  0.000135 
Rest of Middle East
 b 0.000002 -0.000001 -0.000007 
Rest of South African Customs Union
 b -0.000002 0.000048  -0.000034 
Zambia
 a -0.000010 -0.000001 -0.000184 
Non-LDC regions    
Australia   -0.000264  0.006333  0.004301 
New Zealand   -0.000046  -0.000393  -0.000976 
China   0.000005  -0.000077  -0.000352 
Hong Kong   0.000011  0.000067  0.000143 
Japan   ..  0.000054  -0.000008 
Korea   0.000001  0.000017  0.000072 
Taiwan   0.000001  0.000003  0.000006 
Indonesia   0.000002  -0.000012  -0.000056 
Malaysia   0.000009  0.000006  0.000028 
Philippines   0.000011  -0.000022  0.000033 
Singapore   0.000004  -0.000016  0.000020 
Thailand   0.000007  0.000018  0.000009 
Vietnam   -0.000036  -0.000209  -0.000336 
India   0.000006  0.000087  0.000063 
Sri Lanka   0.000032  -0.000082  0.000050 
Canada   -0.000002  -0.000004  -0.000031 
United States   -0.000001  -0.000025  -0.000095 
Rest of Latin America   ..  0.000018  -0.000005 
European Union   -0.000003  0.000008  -0.000026 
Rest of Western Europe   ..  0.000008  -0.000027 
Eastern Europe   ..  0.000030  0.000023 
Turkey   0.000003  0.000047  0.000136 
Morocco   0.000018  0.000118  0.000219 
Rest of North Africa   0.000008  0.000040  0.000099 
Botswana   -0.000005  0.000050  0.000014 
Zimbabwe   -0.000010  -0.000001  -0.000184 
Total -0.000002  0.000098  0.000098 
a Individual LDC.  
b Region inclusive of LDCs. ..  Less than 0.000001 per cent. 
Source: GTAP simulation. 
 
  Previous discussion has shown that according to current trade patterns, the changes in 
tariff preference are likely to affect mainly trade in clothing, sourced from a few LDCs, such 
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other countries that compete directly with LDCs in the Australian market, such as Fiji and 
China, are also adversely affected.  
  Table 3 reports the simulated effects of the policy change on LDC exports to Australia.  
It shows that clothing exports to Australia from LDCs are projected to increase.  In particular, 
clothing exports from Bangladesh to Australia are predicted to increase 11-fold.  Exports to 
Australia from Cambodia, Burma and Nepal are also projected to increase by large 
proportions.  Clothing exports account for almost the entire rise in LDC exports to Australia.  
Overall, total export volumes from LDCs to Australia are projected to increase by 12 per cent, 
which is driven mainly by a 5-fold increase in exports of clothing. 
  As Bangladesh is a separate region in the database, the effects on this LDC economy 
can be discussed in more detail.  Table 4 reports the projected changes in some indicators of 
the Bangladeshi economy.  The table shows that a country benefiting from the tariff 
preference increases its exports to Australia by diverting some of their traditional TCF exports 
from other destinations (in the case of Bangladesh, away from the United States and the 
European Union).  Meanwhile, as its export market expands, it diverts resources away from 
other parts of the economy into its clothing sector.  As a result, Bangladesh’s clothing 
industry is projected to expand by more than any other sector (0.15 per cent).  
  14Table 3  Simulated effects on LDCs’ exports to Australia  




Asia     
Afghanistan    -0.06 .. .. .. 
Bangladesh 
b 32.69 14,520  1,150.19 14,431 
Bhutan    -0.02 .. .. .. 
Burma   14.62  1331  160.59  1,327 
Cambodia    129.99 2,617  259.94 2,606 
Laos People’s Democratic Republic  126.46  141  255.67  141 
Nepal    52.63 1,115 77.34 1,104 
Africa     
Comoros, Republic   -0.02  ..  ..  .. 
Democratic Republic of Congo   0.53  2  313.15  2 
Equatorial  Guinea    -0.01 .. .. .. 
Eritrea  1.28 .. .. .. 
Ethiopia   1.73  31  250.54  2 
Gambia    3.00 ..  12.26 .. 
Guinea    -0.01 .. .. .. 
Lesotho    0.17 ..  296.30 .. 
Liberia  0.46 .. .. .. 
Madagascar  8.56 75  88.91 75 
Malawi 
b -0.01 ..  -0.58 .. 
Mali 7.86  27  179.16  1 
Mauritania  -0.01 .. .. .. 
Mozambique 
b 1.25 1  -0.58 .. 
Senegal  7.54 3  136.11 .. 
Sierra  Leone  -0.04 .. .. .. 
Tanzania 
b .. ..  0.72 .. 
Uganda 
b 0.29 18  1,219.06 19 
Zambia 
b .. ..  -0.58 .. 
Others     
Haiti    5.32 2  256.05 1 
Kiribati (SPARTECA)  3.83  21  ..  .. 
Maldives    13.25 ..  221.76 .. 
Samoa (SPARTECA)  -0.02  -12  ..  .. 
Solomon Islands (SPARTECA)  0.02  1  ..  .. 
Vanuatu  (SPARTECA)  0.41 5  -1.29 .. 
Sum  of  LDCs  12.48 19,899 423.10 19,710 
Notes: (1) 
a Based on 1997 Australian import values.  (2) 
b Identified separately in GTAP.  (3) The following 8 
LDCs with no exports to Australia in 1997 are excluded from the table: Tuvalu (SPARTECA), Cape Verde, 
Central Africa Republic, Chad, Benin, Djibouti, Guinea Bissau and Burkina Faso.  (4) The following 9 LDCs 
with simulated change less than 0.005 per cent or A$500 are excluded from the table: Yemen, Angola, Burundi, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome PR, Somalia, Sudan and Togo.  (5) .. less than 0.005 per cent or A$500.  
Source: GTAP and post-solution simulations.  
 
  15Table 4  Simulated effects on Bangladesh 
Indicator  % 
Clothing sector  
Exports to Australia  1,151 
Exports to EU and USA  -0.58 
Domestic clothing output  0.15 
Macro  
Real GDP  0.001 
Real consumption  0.005 
Real aggregate exports  0.018 
Real aggregate imports  0.041 
Source: GTAP simulation. 
 
  Inputs into the clothing industry increase to accommodate the increase in exports and 
production. This includes increases in domestically-produced inputs (such as cotton) and 
imported inputs. Other imports also increase in response to increased real consumption. Both 
effects are reflected in the increase in aggregate imports (table 4). Overall, there is a positive 
gain in real GDP and real consumption in Bangladesh. The same results are observed for 
those LDCs that have a well developed domestic clothing industry and established clothing 
exports to the Australian market.  
  The effect of tariff preference on the trading partner countries that have been 
discriminated against depends on how substitutable their exports are for those from the 
beneficiary LDCs in the donor’s market, and the size of their market share relative to that of 
LDCs. Given the parameters adopted in the database, the substitution between import sources 
are equal for all suppliers. As a result, it is market shares that determine the responsiveness of 
non-beneficiary trading partners. 
  For a large clothing exporter such as China (which supplies more than 30 per cent of 
Australian clothing imports), the effects of granting preferential access to LDC exports is very 
modest: a fall by about 0.57 per cent.  As clothing is not dominant in Chinese exports, this fall 
has little overall impact on the Chinese economy, as seen in the change in real GDP in table 2. 
Moreover, the pattern of Chinese exports of clothing and intermediate inputs into clothing 
production (textiles and semi-finished clothing products) also contribute to the overall results 
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other countries.  Although China’s direct exports of clothing to Australia are projected to fall, 
the rise of LDC clothing exports encourages China’s exports of textiles and semi-finished 
clothing to LDCs, which partly compensates for the fall in clothing exports to Australia.  
  For small developing countries relying heavily on clothing exports to Australia, 
especially members of SPARTECA, the potential impact of providing tariff preferences to 
LDCs is comparatively greater. For instance, Australia accounts for more than one-third of 
Fiji’s exports.  Exports of clothing account for around 25 per cent of all Fijian exports (UN 
2000). Fiji’s exports of clothing to Australia are projected to fall by about 1.3 per cent, or 
A$1.8 million.  Although this is still small in percentage terms, this is likely to have an 
adverse effect on its domestic economy; much larger than the effects projected for other 
clothing exporters, such as China. 
  The simulated effects on Australian industries are reported in table 5.  As expected, the 
Australian clothing industry is affected the most among all industries. However the effect is 
still modest; the output of clothing is projected to fall by just 0.12 per cent and the imports of 
clothing to rise by about 0.44 per cent.  This is because imports from LDCs are a small share 
of total Australian imports.  Australian demand for most imports falls except for parts of 
clothing (Wearing apparel), but overall import volumes still rise slightly by 0.043 per cent.  
Foreign demand for most Australian exports increases, which drives up the output of most 
industries.  
  17Table 5  Simulated effects on Australian industries (per cent) 
Industry Domestic  output  Export volume  Import volume 
Wearing apparel   -0.1165  0.0167  0.4355 
Textiles   -0.0231  0.0075  -0.0322 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
a -0.0038 0.0026  -0.0244 
Petroleum, coal products   -0.0001  0.0010  .. 
Services   ..  0.0075  -0.0039 
Paper products, publishing   0.0002  0.0053  -0.0030 
Fishing 
a 0.0004 0.0023  -0.0013 
Coal   0.0004  0.0005  .. 
Meat products n.e.c. 
a 0.0005 0.0053  -0.0030 
Oil 0.0005  0.0010  -0.0004 
Forestry 
a 0.0008 0.0071  -0.0032 
Gas   0.0009  0.0001  .. 
Beverages and tobacco products 
a 0.0010 0.0099  -0.0057 
Wood products   0.0011  0.0072  -0.0035 
Cereal grains n.e.c. 
a 0.0012 0.0020  -0.0025 
Crops n.e.c. 
a 0.0015 0.0049  -0.0012 
Food products n.e.c.   0.0015  0.0071  -0.0032 
Animal products n.e.c.   0.0016  0.0061  -0.0027 
Mineral products n.e.c.   0.0017  0.0089  -0.0031 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
a 0.0018 0.0058  -0.0015 
Raw milk 
a 0.0018 0.0057  -0.0027 
Dairy products   0.0018  0.0054  -0.0020 
Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses 
a 0.0020 0.0028  -0.0008 
Metal products   0.0020  0.0100  -0.0034 
Vegetable oils and fats 
a 0.0021 0.0057  -0.0011 
Chemical, rubber, plastic products   0.0022  0.0055  -0.0013 
Bovine cattle, sheep and goat meat   0.0024  0.0047  -0.0020 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 
a 0.0024 0.0040  -0.0007 
Sugar   0.0025  0.0044  0.0019 
Wheat 
a 0.0025 0.0028  -0.0005 
Oil seeds   0.0025  0.0048  0.0005 
Paddy rice 
a 0.0027 0.0032  -0.0010 
Plant-based fibers 
a 0.0027 0.0052  -0.0280 
Processed rice   0.0027  0.0054  -0.0027 
Minerals n.e.c.   0.0039  0.0037  0.0022 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c.   0.0044  0.0091  -0.0018 
Ferrous metals   0.0047  0.0088  -0.0012 
Motor vehicles and parts   0.0047  0.0161  -0.0050 
Electronic equipment   0.0048  0.0080  -0.0009 
Manufactures n.e.c.   0.0048  0.0093  -0.0025 
Transport equipment n.e.c.   0.0058  0.0148  -0.0052 
Leather products   0.0063  0.0173  0.0001 
Metals n.e.c.   0.0070  0.0078  -0.0004 
Note:  (1) 
a Agricultural products.  (2) n.e.c.: not elsewhere classified.  (3) .. less than 0.00005 per cent. 
Source: GTAP simulation. 
 
  As discussed in section 2, the effects of PTAs depend, among other things, on the 
substitutability between domestic goods and the goods imported from various trading 
  18partners.  In the case of the Australian LDC initiative, the simulation results are particularly 
sensitive to the substitution elasticities between Australian domestic clothing products and the 
imports of clothing products from LDCs and other trading partners.  The results presented 
above are based on the parameters in the database applied here, in which the elasticity of 
substitution between Australian domestic clothing and the composite of imported clothing is 
4.4 while that between any pair of import sources is 8.8, both of which are quite high, 
compared with that for other products.  If clothing products from different countries are 
assumed to be less substitutable than that implied by the parameters used here, the effects of 
the Australian LDC initiative are likely to be smaller.7
 
6  Summary and concluding remarks 
Australia, along with other industrialised countries, has committed itself to provide tariff- and 
quota-free access to its markets for least-developed countries (LDCs), in line with the Doha 
ministerial declaration (UNCTAD 2001a).  Here we use an applied general equilibrium (GE) 
model of world trade and a post-solution model, to quantify the economic effects of Australia 
adopting such a policy.  Our results suggest that the general effects are quite small for 
Australia but significant for LDCs.  The major effects are largely consistent with predictions 
from a simple three-region three-good analytical model.  
  First, preference receivers, especially those exporting to Australia, are projected to 
benefit, as the analytical model predicts.  Accordingly, the gains tend to be concentrated in 
major LDC clothing exporters due to high tariffs that clothing products attract.  Second, the 
extent to which other trading partners might benefit depends on several factors, which are 
identified in the analytical model; the substitutability between exports from different trading 
                                              
7 This view is supported by a similarity analysis conducted by PC (2002), which indicates possible low 
substitutability between Australian domestic clothing products and clothing imports, and between clothing 
products imported from different countries. 
  19partners and the levels of tariffs their products attract.  In this case, the overall effect depends 
also on the importance of clothing exports in their domestic economies.  Third, for the 
preference-giving country, Australia, the general effect is negative, as expected.  This reflects 
the dominance of trade diversion over trade creation effects and adverse terms of trade effects.  
However, the magnitude of the adverse effects on Australian industries in general, and the 
clothing industry in particular, are small due to the limited size of LDC imports.  These 
projections are closely in line with those obtained in similar studies such as UNCTAD’s 
analysis on Quad LDC initiatives (2001a).  If one was to view this initiative as an exercise in 
foreign aid, it suggests that Australia can provide a significant benefit to the poorest nations 
with which it trades, at almost no cost to itself.  
  Moreover, the GE results also reveal some interactions and effects that the simple 
analytical model is unable to capture.  For instance, the numerical model shows that some 
countries competing with LDCs in Australian markets, such as China, may not necessarily 
lose from such a policy change, because they can benefit indirectly from increasing their 
exports of intermediate inputs to the exporting sectors in LDCs.  These interactions can only 
be accurately captured by an applied GE model, thus aiding in understanding the complexity 
of analysing preferential trading arrangements. 
  It should also be noted that applied GE models also have their limitations.  For instance, 
these models still do not capture all the factors that may determine the outcome of preferential 
liberalisation.  In the real world, to what extent a beneficiary trading partner can gain from 
such a policy change depends significantly on the responsiveness of its domestic industries.  
The responsiveness of domestic production is likely to vary significantly across LDCs, and 
these differences are not explicitly captured in the GE model applied here.  In LDCs with 
limited responsiveness, a favourable external opportunity may not be sufficiently strong 
enough to overcome all the domestic constraints, such as underdeveloped infrastructure and 
  20shortage of some factors of production.  Efforts in capacity building in LDCs, for example, 
may improve their infrastructure.  Some LDCs would then become more attractive places for 
foreign investment or technology transfer, and offer opportunities for industrialised countries 
to reallocate more labour intensive sections of production to these countries.  A model 
explicitly incorporating foreign investment would capture the effects of such globalisation of 
production.  Moreover, a dynamic framework would be needed to illustrate the process of 
reallocating production facilities and movement of productive factors across countries.   
Despite this, the analysis presented here represents an important first pass at measuring some 
of the major effects of Australia granting duty-free access to its markets for LDCs; effects 
which are of interest to policy makers and scholars in Australia, LDCs and other countries.  
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LDCs in the post-solution model 







Central America and the Caribbean  Haiti 
Rest of Middle East  Yemen 
Rest of World  Afghanistan 
Rest of World  Cambodia 
Rest of World  Laos People’s Democratic Republic 
Rest of World  Burma 
Rest of World  Kiribati (SPARTECA) 
Rest of World  Samoa (SPARTECA) 
Rest of World  Solomon Islands (SPARTECA) 
Rest of World  Tuvalu (SPARTECA) 
Rest of World  Vanuatu (SPARTECA) 
Rest of South Asia  Bhutan 
Rest of South Asia  Maldives 
Rest of South Asia  Nepal 
Rest of South African Customs Union  Lesotho 
Rest of Southern Africa  Angola 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Burundi 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Cape Verde 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Central Africa Republic 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Chad 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Comoros, Republic 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Benin 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Equatorial Guinea 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Democratic Republic of Congo 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Ethiopia 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Djibouti 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Gambia 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Guinea 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Liberia 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Madagascar 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Mali 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Mauritania 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Niger 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Guinea Bissau 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Rwanda 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Sao Tome PR 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Senegal 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Sierra Leone 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Somalia 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Sudan 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Togo 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Burkina Faso 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  Eritrea 
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